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The use of DNA evidence within the criminal justice system has 
become a part of popular culture. The growth of the “CSI” franchise 
on major network television,1 coupled with its success in attaining 
viewers,2 may suggest a public fascination with the use of scientific 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 As of February 2007, CBS aired three separate television shows based on the 
CSI franchise: CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, CSI: Miami, and CSI: NY. See CSI 
Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi/ (last visited April 22, 2008); CSI: 
Miami Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi_miami/ (last visited April 22, 
2008); CSI: NY Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi_ny/ (last visited 
April 22, 2008). 
2 According to Neilsen Media Research, CSI: Crime Scene Investigation was 
the most watched show on U.S. television for the 2002-03 television season. Joal 
Ryan, TV Season Wraps; “CSI” Rules, EONLINE, May 22, 2003, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=2c7a48e7-bd06-4a73-9311-
0bab5caf4ef1&page=2 (last visited April 22, 2008). CSI maintained its dominance 
throughout the decade, ranking 2nd in viewership for 2003-04, 3rd in 2005-06, and 
4th in 2006-07, while its sister show, CSI: Miami, placed 9th in 2003-04, 7th in 
2004-05, and 9th in 2005-06. See Joal Ryan, “Idol” Rules TV Season, EONLINE, 
1
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techniques to solve crimes.3 The popularity of the show (and its 
imitators) is a small example of the way in which DNA testing has 
revolutionized the criminal justice system. Yet for all its advantages, 
access to DNA evidence—and the increasingly accurate results 
derived from improved testing4—is subject to a procedural roadblock 
in some jurisdictions that limits access to those who may benefit from 
its use. Specifically, the procedural roadblock erected in some 
jurisdictions prevents prisoners from gaining post-conviction access to 
physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing through a § 1983 
claim. Instead, those jurisdictions limit prisoners to the more 
complicated—and potentially more restrictive and time-consuming—
habeas corpus relief. 
There are two judicial methods by which a prisoner may gain 
access to physical evidence in order to conduct DNA testing. First, the 
universally accepted method is through a writ of habeas corpus, by 
                                                                                                                   
May 27, 2004, http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=f11a7579-284c-
4d9b-bc69-3bfd2b9bec42&page=2 (2003-04 Nielsen ratings) (last visited April 22, 
2008); Joal Ryan, No Toppling “Idol”, EONLINE, June 1, 2005, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=9c3320c5-f831-4443-9776-
a2061f3b9ddd&page=2 (2004-05 Nielsen ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008); Joal 
Ryan, “Idol” Extends Reign, EONLINE, May 25, 2006, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=8ccaf68b-821c-4eec-91cb-
1f269b21391c (2005-06 ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008); Joal Ryan, Idol 
Biggest of Smallest, EONLINE, May 25, 2007, http://www.eonline.com/news/article/ 
index.jsp?uuid=17b8f65c-3700-49b5-8432-b0ac725ccf21&page=2 (2006-07 Nielsen 
ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008). 
3 The phenomenon does not appear limited to the U.S. As of December 2006, 
the CSI franchise was “syndicated in 200 countries to a global audience of 2 billion.” 
Gerard Gilbert, CSI: The cop show that conquered the world, THE INDEPENDENT, 
Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/csi-the-cop-show-that-
conquered-the-world-429262.html (last visited April 22, 2008). It has been 
anecdotally suggested that American juries now expect a higher standard of forensic 
evidence due in part to the show’s popularity. Id.  
4 DNA testing in the early 1990s, which used the PCR method, could isolate a 
genetic marker that would be shared by only 2 percent of the population, or one in 
fifty. The chance of two people matching genetic markers in current STR testing are 
less than one in a trillion. Fay Flam, Initial DNA Scientist Vindicated, but still has 
concerns, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, A-14, Jan. 13, 2006.  
2
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which a prisoner may challenge the validity of his confinement.5 The 
second, more controversial method is through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Created by the Civil Rights Act, this cause of action allows any person 
to file a civil claim in federal court if their constitutional rights have 
been violated by a state actor under color of state law.6 While both 
methods can yield the access to post-conviction DNA testing that the 
prisoner seeks, habeas corpus relief is subject to several rules—such as 
the “state exhaustion” requirement—which can make it a less 
desirable route to relief than § 1983. Federal appellate courts are split 
on the validity of these methods. While the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that a claim requesting post-conviction access to 
DNA evidence is cognizable under both habeas corpus proceedings 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,7 the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have 
limited the relief to such requests strictly to a writ of habeas corpus.8 
In Savory v. Lyons, the Seventh Circuit faced the question of 
whether a prisoner could validly make a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of 
DNA testing.9 In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit declined to join the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach, instead following the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits in holding that such a claim under § 1983 was viable.10 In 
reaching its decision, the Savory court drew support from the 2005 
Supreme Court case Wilkinson v. Dotson, a case which updated the 
Court’s treatment of the tension between § 1983 and habeas claims for 
post-conviction relief without expressly speaking to the issue of DNA 
testing. By recognizing that Dotson’s reasoning all but expressly 
resolved the dispute over the viability of state prisoner’s § 1983 claims 
                                                 
5 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  
6 Id. at 483-84. 
7 See Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District, 423 
F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-92 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
8 See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery 
County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed.Appx. 340, 340 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
9 Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 
10 Id. at 672. 
3
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for post-conviction access to DNA testing, the Savory court reached 
the proper result and ensured that future decisions in the Seventh 
Circuit will be decided on their merits, rather than be derailed by 
procedural roadblocks.11 
This comment examines the ramifications of the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Savory concerning whether § 1983 may act as a vehicle to 
obtain post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of 
DNA testing. Part I provides a brief introduction to the writ of habeas 
corpus and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the relative merits of each in 
terms of post-conviction access. Part II examines the judicial stage set 
for Savory, including Supreme Court precedents and the conflicting 
interpretations developed by the Circuits. Part III discusses the facts, 
holding, and reasoning of Savory. Finally, Part IV examines Savory 
within the context of the circuit split and the Dotson decision, and 
argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the proper result by holding 
that state prisoners’ § 1983 claims seeking post-conviction access to 





                                                 
11 It has been argued that this “overproceduralism” makes it difficult for 
inmates to have their constitutional claims heard. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-
Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: 
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 
315-16 (1998). 
12 It is critical to note that while the plaintiff in Savory brought a § 1983 claim 
asserting a constitutional right of due process to post-conviction access to physical 
evidence for the purpose of DNA testing, Savory does not answer the question of 
whether such a right exists. 469 F.3d at 675. Indeed, because the statute of 
limitations for a § 1983 claim had elapsed in Savory, the court was not forced to 
answer such a question. Id. Instead, Savory deals with the procedural question of 
whether § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle to make such a challenge. Judge King’s 
dissent in Harvey takes special effort to note that though he believes § 1983 is a 
proper vehicle for such a claim, the US Constitution does not support a due process 
right to post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing 
under the facts of that case. 278 F.3d at 388 (King, J., dissenting). 
4
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I.  THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
In examining whether prisoners should be able to use a § 1983 
action to gain post-conviction access to physical evidence, or instead 
be limited to habeas corpus relief, it is necessary to address a threshold 
question: why does it matter which approach the prisoner uses? If a 
prisoner is guaranteed to have his habeas claim heard, why bother 
filing a § 1983 claim of questionable validity? The answer lies in the 
procedural elements specific to each approach, which yield concrete 
differences in how the prisoner’s desired result is reached. It is these 
procedural differences that make § 1983 claims more desirable to a 
prisoner than a habeas claim, thereby making the cognizability of the 
§ 1983 claim for post-conviction access to DNA testing of importance.  
 
A.  Habeas Corpus 
 
The writ of habeas corpus provides a vehicle by which a prisoner 
can challenge the validity of his imprisonment.13 Thus, if a state 
prisoner is held in violation of his federal constitutional rights, he may 
apply for a writ of habeas corpus for relief.14 Inspired by the Magna 
Carta and imported from English law,15 the writ of habeas corpus is 
often referred to as the “Great Writ” due to its central role in 
preserving basic notions of due process and “personal liberty.”16 The 
Supreme Court once wrote: 
 
[a]though in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of 
procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with 
                                                 
13 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 
14 See Steiker, supra n.11, at 325 (writing that “federal habeas remains 
available for the redress of virtually all federal constitutional violations”). 
15 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (discussing the introduction of a 
bill before the English House of Commons in 1593 to implement the use of the writ 
of habeas corpus to combat perceived violations of due process guaranteed by the 
Magna Carta). While Fay is no longer good law, its historical discussion of the writ 
of habeas corpus remains relevant. 
16 Id. at 401. 
5
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the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. 
For its function has been to provide a prompt and 
efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be 
intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a 
civilized society, government must always be 
accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: 
if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with 
the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is 
entitled to his immediate release.17 
 
Indeed, the writ is so vital to American ideals that the Founding 
Fathers felt compelled to guarantee its maintenance in the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause.18 
The federal habeas corpus statute states that a federal court may 
only consider a state prisoner’s writ of habeas corpus application if the 
grounds for that application are that his imprisonment violates federal 
law.19 Furthermore, a federal court will not grant a writ of habeas 
corpus if the state prisoner has failed to exercise all available state 
remedies.20 Known as the “state exhaustion” requirement, this means 
                                                 
17 Id. at 401-402. 
18 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion or the public Safety may require it.” U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
19 The statute reads: 
 
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000). 
20 The statute states: 
 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall 
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an 
6
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that if the state prisoner has any unused “right” or “procedure” 
available under state law to address the issue presented in his 
application for a writ of habeas corpus, the federal court will not grant 
the writ.21 
Federalism concerns underlie the imposition of this “state 
exhaustion” requirement. Specifically, courts have expressed concern 
that allowing a federal court to correct errors of federal law made by 
state courts, without first giving the state court system opportunity to 
correct the error itself, would generate friction between the two 
systems.22 The “state exhaustion” requirement is an expression of the 
doctrine of “comity”23—it does not eliminate the federal habeas 
corpus remedy, but rather defers its exercise until all available state 
remedies have been exercised.24 
                                                                                                                   
absence of available State corrective process; or circumstances 
exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
applicant.  
 
28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1) (2000). 
21 “An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available 
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under 
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 
U.S.C. 2254(c) (2000). 
22 See Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); see also Darr v. 
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (explaining that “it would be unseemly in our 
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court 
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional 
violation”).  
23 “[T]he doctrine of comity between courts . . . teaches that one court should 
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another 
sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had 
an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Darr, 339 U.S. at 204.  
24 The Supreme Court wrote in Cook v. Hart: 
 
[C]omity demands that the state courts, under whose process [the 
prisoner] is held, and which are, equally with federal courts, 
charged with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment 
of his constitutional rights, should be appealed to in the first 
instance. Should such rights be denied, his remedy in the federal 
court will remain unimpaired. 
7
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B.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 as a method to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.25 It creates a 
civil cause of action by which any person may challenge state action 
that violates their federal constitutional or statutory rights in federal 
court.26 The Supreme Court has compared § 1983 to a common law 
tort action,27 established on “the principle that a person should be 
compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal 
rights.”28 An action brought under § 1983 may seek declaratory, 
injunctive, and monetary relief.29 
Like an application for writ of habeas corpus, a successful § 1983 
claim requires a violation of federal law.30 In the context of obtaining 
post-conviction access to DNA testing, state prisoners often allege that 
denial of access to DNA testing constitutes a violation of due process 
                                                                                                                   
 
146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892). 
25 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982). 
26 The statute states in relevant part: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute. . . of any 
State. . . subjects. . . any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
27 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994); see also Student Note, 
Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to DNA 
Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 593-94 (2004). 
28 Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 
(1978)); see also Vetter, supra n.27, at 595. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See also Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: 
Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus 
Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 89 (1988). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (protecting “immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws”). 
8
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under Brady v. Maryland.31 In Brady, a man convicted of murder in a 
Maryland state court argued that the prosecution had suppressed 
exculpatory statements of a witness in violation of due process.32 The 
Court agreed with the prisoner, holding that “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment.”33 The Court reasoned that such disclosure by the 
prosecution is necessary for a fair trial, which is a fundamental 
concept of our judicial system.34  Subsequent to Brady, courts have 
argued that if this fairness principle requires disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence before trial, there is no reason it should not likewise extend 
to disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence (such as DNA 
evidence) after the trial.35 Therefore, when a state officer refuses a 
prisoner post-conviction access to DNA testing, a prisoner raising a 
§ 1983 claim would argue that the state officer denying access to the 
evidence had deprived him of his constitutional right to due process 
under color of state law. 
Section 1983 actions are not subject to the “state exhaustion” 
requirement because the statute was enacted to circumvent the legal 
systems of states that were unwilling to enforce their own laws.36 
Specifically, the enacting Congress felt that states’ refusal to address 
                                                 
31 See Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Bradley 
v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378 
(4th Cir. 2002). State prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing are 
not limited to Brady as the basis for a due process violation.  For a more complete 
discussion of possible constitutional violations to use as the basis for a § 1983 claim 
seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing, see Vetter, supra n.27, at 590-93. 
32 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). 
33 Id. at 87. 
34 Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas wrote, “[s]ociety wins not only 
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Id. 
35 Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig, J. concurring); see also Vetter, 
supra n.27, at 591-92. Vetter notes that while this extends the meaning of Brady 
beyond its plain language, “the extension is not entirely unreasonable and has been 
accepted by at least one district court.” Vetter, supra n.27, at 591-92. 
36 Schwartz, supra n.29, at 89. 
9
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Klu Klux Klan violence by applying their own laws required a federal 
work-around.37 Where both Congress and subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions expressed such a clear distrust of state action in the matter, 
implementing a “state exhaustion” requirement would have voided the 
purpose of the statute.38 
 
C.  Why the decision between habeas corpus and § 1983 matters 
 
The growth of constitutional rights extended to state prisoners in 
the middle of the 20th century, paired with a dearth of post-conviction 
rights actually offered by the states, generated a system in which 
federal courts seemed to supervise state procedures.39 In order to 
protect their decisions, states responded by expanding their own post-
conviction procedures.40 This growth of state procedure, when paired 
with the federal habeas statute’s exhaustion requirement, created 
added delay to the adjudication of prisoners’ constitutional rights.41 In 
addition, prisoners subject to these state post-conviction procedures 
may not receive the full protections ordinarily accorded under due 
process,42 raising the question of whether these added procedures 
serve the interests of justice. 
Section 1983 claims present plaintiffs with a number of 
advantages over federal habeas applications. First, because § 1983 
claims are not subject to the added delay of the state exhaustion 
requirement, state prisoners may seek immediate relief in federal 
court.43 Additionally, because § 1983 is a civil action, prisoners may 
seek monetary damages in addition to any injunctive or declaratory 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 90. 
39 Steiker, supra n.11, at 342 (1998). 
40 Id. at 342-43. 
41 Id. at 343. 
42 Id. For instance, Professor Striker notes that prisoners are not entitled to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state post-conviction hearings. Id. at 343-44, 
n.114; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
43 Vetter, supra n.27, at 595.  
10
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relief.44 On the other hand, the lack of a state exhaustion requirement 
means that state courts  may find their decisions overturned in federal 
court as the result of § 1983 actions, increasing friction between the 
state and federal judicial systems.45  Nevertheless, the significant 
advantages in bringing a § 1983 action rather than seeking federal 
habeas relief led state prisoners to begin using § 1983 as an alternative 
to habeas corpus when attempting to have their constitutional claims 
heard.46 The significant overlap of the two approaches eventually 
required judicial intervention. 
 
II.  JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the conflict 
between prisoners using § 1983 and writs of habeas corpus in the 1973 
case Preiser v. Rodriguez.47 The Court later clarified its position in 
1994 with Heck v. Humphrey.48 Though neither case specifically 
addressed how § 1983 and habeas claims pertained to requests for 
post-conviction access to DNA testing, they created the larger 
framework by which later analysis would be conducted. Subsequent to 
Heck, a split developed between several Federal Circuit courts over 
whether such post-conviction DNA testing requests could be made 
using § 1983, or instead limited to habeas relief. As the Circuits 
debated, the Supreme Court issued Wilkinson v. Dotson, which further 
clarified Heck without speaking definitively on the issue of post-
conviction access to DNA testing.  This section will examine the 
development of these precedents, from the stage set by the Supreme 
Court in Preiser and Heck—and later Dotson—to the decisions 
creating the split amongst the Federal appellate courts. 
                                                 
44 Id. at 595. 
45 See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (writing that federal courts’ 
power to review state court decisions through habeas actions created “an area of 
potential conflict between state and federal courts”). 
46 Vetter, supra n.27, at 595. 
47 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). 
48 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). 
11
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A.  Supreme Court Precedent 
 
1.  Preiser v. Rodriguez 
 
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court heard 
arguments from three New York state prisoners challenging the 
validity of their imprisonment.49 Decided in 1974, Preiser was issued 
almost thirty years before Harvey v. Horan, the first case where 
federal appellate courts grappled with the viability of post-conviction 
DNA testing requests through § 1983.50 In examining the more general 
question of whether a prisoner could challenge his confinement 
through a § 1983 claim,51 however, Preiser  laid the groundwork for 
the later DNA cases. 
Preiser consolidated a number of lawsuits that shared a common 
thread: each prisoner had earned a number of “good-time” credits 
which should have had the effect of shortening their sentence had the 
credits not been revoked by the state prison.52 The prisoners filed 
lawsuits under § 1983 claiming that their credits had been 
unconstitutionally revoked under color of state law.53 Because each 
prisoner had secured enough “good-time” credits to be released 
immediately but for the revocation, a successful challenge of the 
procedures by which they were deprived of those credits would have 
resulted in an immediate release from prison.54 
New York contended that the prisoners’ claims should be limited 
to habeas corpus relief and were not properly brought via § 1983.55 
Because the prisoners were poised to be released from prison if their 
claims succeeded, New York argued that the prisoners were actually 
                                                 
49 411 U.S. at 476-77. 
50 Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002). 
51 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477. 
52 Id. at 476-82. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 487. 
55 See id. at 482. 
12
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challenging the very validity of their imprisonment.56  Such an action 
traditionally could only be accomplished through a writ of habeas 
corpus, which required exhaustion of state remedies.57 In an en banc 
hearing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the State, 
holding that the § 1983 claims were valid, and “not subject to any 
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.”58 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a 6-3 decision, 
holding that the state prisoners were limited to habeas relief.59 In 
justifying its holding, the Court noted that issues of federal-state 
comity were of primary concern.60 While the dissent argued that 
previous Court decisions had allowed § 1983 actions on questions of 
state prison administration without disturbing notions of federal-state 
comity, the majority replied that the issues in those cases did not 
implicate any other statute, while the case before them directly 
addressed the purpose of the federal habeas corpus statute: challenging 
the validity of the prisoners’ confinement.61 Thus, the court held that 
“when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his 
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that 
he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from 
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”62 
The Preiser Court noted in dicutm that its holding did not prevent 
a prisoner from bringing a suit under § 1983 seeking montetary 
damages.63  While the plaintiffs’ requests in Preiser for equitable relief 
would have resulted in restoration of their good-time credits, and 
therefore resulted in their immediate release, the Court wrote that an 
award of damages would yield no direct effect on the “fact or length” 
                                                 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. The Second Circuit’s decision was highly contested within the en banc 
panel, generating opinions by eight judges, including three dissents. Id. 
59 Id. at 500. 
60 Id. at 591. 
61 Id. at 592 n.10. 
62 See id. at 500. 
63 Id. at 494. 
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of a prisoner’s imprisonment.64 Despite the Court’s plain language 
authorizing prisoners to use § 1983 to seek monetary damages in 
Preiser,65 the Court would be forced to readdress the issue 21 years 
later in Heck v. Humphrey. 
 
2.  Heck v. Humphrey 
 
In Heck v. Humphrey, an Indiana state prisoner convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter filed a § 1983 claim against several state 
officials, alleging, amongst other things, that his prosecution had been 
unlawful and the defendants had destroyed exculpatory evidence.66 
However, rather than seeking his release through injunctive relief, the 
plaintiff sought money damages.67 Heck sheds light on the split over 
post-conviction DNA testing because rather than seeking actual release 
from prison—which would have been the ultimate result had the 
Preiser plaintiffs succeeded in their § 1983 claims— both the Heck 
and DNA plaintiffs sought some other form of relief. Both the District 
Court and the Seventh Circuit agreed that although the Heck plaintiff’s 
claim did not seek his release from prison, a victory on the merits 
would call into question the very validity of his confinement.68 
Because Preiser’s dictum concerning monetary damages appeared to 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 The Presier Court wrote: 
 
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something 
other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking 
something other than immediate or more speedy release—the more 
traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages 
claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal 
remedy. Accordingly, . . . a damages action by a state prisoner 
could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court 
without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies. 
 
Id.  
66 512 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1994). 
67 Id. at 479. 
68 Id. at 479-80. 
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carve out an opening for a valid § 1983 claim, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether the prisoner’s claim could 
rightly be heard.69 
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
holding that a § 1983 claim for money damages cannot stand if the 
plaintiff’s victory on the merits would call into question the validity or 
duration of his imprisonment.70 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
began by highlighting Preiser’s dictum, which stated that a prisoner’s 
§ 1983 claim for money damages would not trigger the state 
exhaustion requirement because it wouldn’t attack the validity or 
duration of a prisoner’s confinement.71 However, he noted “[t]hat 
statement might not be true . . . when establishing the basis for the 
damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the 
conviction.”72 For instance, Justice Scalia explained that a case in 
which a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim for money damages alleging 
that a prison had used the wrong administrative procedures did not 
violate Preiser because the prisoner was not challenging the essence of 
his confinement, but rather a set of procedures that were used.73 On the 
other hand, if the Heck plaintiff were to win his § 1983 claim on the 
merits, a court would have to find that the defendants actually did 
conduct an unlawful investigation and destroyed exculpatory evidence. 
Such a finding would clearly call into question the validity of the 
plaintiff’s confinement, an outcome prohibited by Preiser if it results 
from a § 1983 claim. 
The Court rationalized its holding by drawing an analogy between 
the Heck plaintiff’s suit and the common law tort of malicious 
                                                 
69 Id. at 480. 
70 Id. at 487. 
71 Id. at 481. 
72 Id. at 481-82. 
73 Id. at 482-83. Here the Court was referring to the facts of Wolff v. 
McDonnell, a case in which the Court held that the prisoner’s § 1983 claim for 
damages was valid. See  418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
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prosecution.74 One key element a plaintiff must establish in a 
malicious prosecution action is that the underlying criminal 
proceeding was resolved in his favor.75 The rationale behind this 
requirement is that it helps provide finality in criminal judgments, and 
prevents prisoners from making collateral attacks on their 
convictions.76 The Court therefore reasoned that if such collateral 
attacks were prevented in the common law, then the same requirement 
should be applied to the tort liability created by § 1983.77 
Seeking to clarify any misconceptions caused by Preiser’s dictum, 
the Court held that in order for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim for money 
damages to survive, “a district court must consider whether a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”78  Justice Scalia went on to 
note that “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, 
even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any 
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should 
be allowed to proceed.”79 
 
B.  The Circuit Split: Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing 
 
After Preiser and Heck, lower courts began to struggle with the 
issue of whether a prisoner’s post-conviction request for access to 
physical evidence for DNA testing could properly be brought under 
§ 1983, or was instead restricted to habeas relief.  The Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits held that such requests should be limited to habeas 
relief. While the leading cases in those jurisdictions were heard prior 
to Dotson, subsequent decisions in those circuits have persisted in 
                                                 
74 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. The Court also reasoned that because § 1983 created 
a kind of tort liability, and tort liability was derived from the common law, then the 
common law should be consulted for guidance. Id. at 483. 
75 Id. at 484. 
76 Id. at 484-85. 
77 Id. at 486. 
78 Id. at 487 (emphasis added). 
79 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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holding that such requests are limited to habeas relief. On the other 
hand, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits held that requests for post-
conviction DNA testing could rightly be made through a § 1983 claim. 
This section will examine the critical cases for each approach. 
 
1.  Habeas Corpus Relief Only—the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits 
 
In the January 2002 decision Harvey v. Horan, the Fourth Circuit 
was the first federal appellate court to hold that a prisoner seeking 
post-conviction access to physical evidence for DNA testing was 
limited to habeas relief.80 The plaintiff in Harvey, a Virginia state 
prisoner who had been convicted of rape and forcible sodomy, filed a 
§ 1983 claim seeking access to the rape kit in order to conduct DNA 
testing that had been unavailable at the time of his conviction.81 The 
district court found that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was cognizable 
because it did not challenge the length or duration of his conviction.82 
The State appealed.83 
In a 2–1 decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court and 
held that a plaintiff seeking post-conviction access to DNA evidence 
was limited to habeas corpus relief. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Judge Wilkinson first looked to Heck’s holding that a plaintiff may not 
use § 1983 if a successful claim would “necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”84 Despite the plaintiff’s 
argument that DNA evidence may just as well prove his guilt, the 
court responded that the plaintiff’s action was only the first step in a 
broader attempt at challenging his conviction.85 As such, the court 
found that the request was merely an attempt at an end run around 
Heck, and held that the § 1983 claim was not viable.86 
                                                 
80 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002). 
81 Id. at 373-74. 
82 Id. at 374. 
83 Id. 
84 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 
85 Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375. 
86 Id. 
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The court proceeded to list a number of policy justifications for 
limiting a plaintiff to habeas relief, the foremost of which was the 
necessity of finality in criminal judgments.87 The court worried that if 
prisoners were able to request new testing of physical evidence every 
time a new form of technology were developed, then the finality of 
criminal judgments would persistently be brought into question.88 The 
court went on to say that “[t]he possibility of post-conviction 
developments, whether in law or science, is simply too great to justify 
judicially sanctioned constitutional attacks upon final criminal 
judgments.”89 
The court also expressed concern that allowing post-conviction 
access to DNA testing of physical evidence through § 1983 claims 
would constitute judicial encroachment on an issue more properly 
settled by the democratic process.90 Noting that several state 
legislatures had taken action in increasing post-conviction access to 
DNA evidence, the court feared that allowing access via § 1983 would 
stunt those initiatives.91 The court therefore held that the plaintiff’s 
§ 1983 claim could not stand, and limited him to habeas relief.92 
Shortly after the Harvey decision, several other circuits followed 
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. In August of 2002, the Fifth Circuit 
held that a prisoner seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing was 
limited to habeas relief, and specifically cited Harvey as persuasive in 
its reasoning.93 One month later, the Sixth Circuit followed similar 
reasoning in an unpublished opinion.94 As recently as June of 2007, a 
court in the Northern District of Texas cited Harvey and its progeny as 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 376. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 377. 
92 Id. 
93 Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2002). 
94 See Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed.Appx. 340 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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support for denying a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim requesting post-
conviction access to DNA testing.95 
 
2.  § 1983 Claims Cognizable—the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
 
Though decisions issued by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits during 
the first 8 months of 2002 suggested a trending building toward 
denying prisoners post-conviction access to DNA testing via a § 1983 
claim, the Eleventh Circuit arrived at a contrary position in Bradley v. 
Pryor, decided in September of 2002.96 The plaintiff in Bradley had 
been convicted in Alabama for the murder of his stepdaughter in 
1983.97 In 2001, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action seeking access to 
the rape kit and the victim’s clothing in order to conduct DNA 
testing.98 A magistrate judge suggested dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, 
stating that it was no different than a habeas application and was 
subject to the habeas requirements.99 The district court adopted the 
magistrate judge’s findings and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.100 The 
plaintiff appealed and the Eleventh Circuit granted review on the issue 
of “[w]hether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action initiated by a state prisoner 
. . . which seeks to compel the state to produce physical evidence for 
DNA testing . . . for the purpose of later asserting a claim of actual 
                                                 
95 Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456 at 5 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2007), 
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2008) 
(looking to Harvey and Kutzner in holding that a prisoner seeking post-conviction 
access to biological evidence for DNA testing was restricted to habeas relief). The 
District Court’s opinion adopted the findings and conclusions of Magistrate Judge 
Paul D. Stickney. Id. at *1. In his opinion, Judge Stickney noted the circuit split, but 
stated that stare decisis bound the court to follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in 
Kutzner. Id. at *6, n.3. 
96 305 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002). 
97 Id. at 1288. 
98 Id. at 1289. The State contended that it no longer had the evidence the 
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innocence . . . is the ‘functional equivalent’ of a petition for federal 
habeas corpus.”101 
Just as the Fourth Circuit did in Harvey, the Bradley court began 
its analysis by looking to Preiser and Heck. The court focused on 
Heck’s language regarding “‘whether a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 
sentence.’”102 However, unlike the Harvey court, the Eleventh Circuit 
was persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that success in his claim 
would not challenge the validity of his imprisonment, but instead 
would merely provide him access to DNA evidence.103 Writing for the 
court, Judge Barkett explained: 
 
[the plaintiff] prevails in this lawsuit once he has access 
to [the DNA] evidence . . . . Nothing in that result 
necessarily demonstrates or even implies that his 
conviction is invalid. As [the plaintiff] points out, it is 
possible that the evidence will not exculpate 
him . . . . But even if the evidence, after testing, permits 
[the plaintiff] to challenge his sentence, that challenge 
is no part of his § 1983 suit. He would have to initiate 
an entirely different lawsuit, alleging an entirely 
different constitutional violation, in order to 
demonstrate that his conviction and sentence are 
invalid.104 
 
The court went on to dismiss the Harvey court’s reasoning that a 
§ 1983 claim for post-conviction access to DNA testing was the 
“functional equivalent of a habeas corpus proceeding” merely because 
it was setting the stage for a subsequent challenge.105 Judge Barkett 
                                                 
101 Id. 
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contended that “[a]lthough [the plaintiff] might use the evidence, at 
some future date, to initiate a separate action challenging his 
conviction, future exculpation is not a necessary implication of [the 
plaintiff’s] claim in this case.”106 As such, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court, and held that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 
seeking post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of 
DNA testing did not violate the language set forth in Heck, and 
remanded for further proceedings.107 
 
C.  Wilkinson v. Dotson and After 
 
As the Circuits developed differing approaches for applying Heck 
to the issue of § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to DNA 
testing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson took a 
step toward clarifying the issue.108 While Heck eliminated the 
confusion revolving around prisoners’ § 1983 claims for money 
damages created by Preiser, the Court in Dotson sought to make a 
broader statement on the validity of prisoner’s § 1983 claims.109  In 
Dotson, two Ohio inmates brought § 1983 claims challenging the 
constitutionality of state parole procedures.110  In each case, the prison 
parole board applied procedures enacted after each inmate had begun 
to serve his sentence.111 The inmates sued under § 1983 in federal 
district court, alleging that the prison officials had violated Due 
Process and the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, and sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief.112 While the district court found that 
the prisoners were restricted to habeas relief and dismissed the 
complaints, the Sixth Circuit found that the § 1983 claims were valid 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1291, 92. 
108 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 77. 
112 Id. 
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and reversed the lower court.113 The Ohio state officials filed a petition 
for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted review.114 
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio state 
prisoners’ § 1983 claims were valid and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. In his majority opinion, Justice Breyer first addressed 
Ohio’s contention that because the prisoners believed that the success 
of their § 1983 claims would ultimately lead to a speedier release from 
prison, they were actually challenging the duration of their 
confinement—essentially an assertion that the prisoners’ § 1983 claim 
violated the holding in Preiser.115 Considering the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the issue, the Court held “that the connection 
between the constitutionality of the prisoners’ parole proceedings and 
release from confinement is too tenuous here to achieve Ohio’s legal 
door-closing objective.”116 
The Court next examined the progression of the issue, including 
Preiser and Heck.117 In order to provide a final and clear statement of 
the law on the issue, Justice Breyer wrote: 
 
These cases, taken together, indicate that a state 
prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior 
invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or 
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s 
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal 
prison proceedings)—if success in that action would 
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement 
or its duration.118 
 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 78. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 78-81. 
118 Id. at 81-82 (emphasis in original). 
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Crucially, the Court found that the prisoners were neither requesting 
speedier release nor challenging the validity of their confinement.119 In 
explaining the potential result of one of the prisoner’s claims, the 
Court wrote that “[s]uccess . . . does not mean immediate release from 
confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new 
eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new 
parole application.”120 Thus, the Dotson court’s analysis hinged on the 
word “necessarily.” Only if the prisoner’s § 1983 claim “necessarily” 
implied the invalidity of his confinement would he be forced to seek 
habeas relief.121 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Dotson stating that 
Ohio’s suggestion that the plaintiff be limited to habeas relief would 
require the Court “to broaden the scope of habeas relief beyond 
recognition.”122 Pointing to the writ’s common law purpose of 
securing immediate release from unlawful confinement, Scalia argued 
that the writ should not be expanded to involve forms of relief too far 
removed from that common law foundation.123 Because the Dotson 
plaintiff’s request for relief—a new parole proceeding—did not fall 
within the realm of the writ’s common law purpose, Justice Scalia 
contended that limiting him to habeas relief would be inappropriate.124 
Thus, where the plaintiff’s requested relief did not bear on the status of 
his confinement, Justice Scalia agreed that a § 1983 claim was 
viable.125 
                                                 
119 Id. at 82. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 81-82. Heck actually used the word “necessarily” in its holding, but 
did nothing to draw attention to its importance. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
487 (1994) (holding that habeas must be used if “judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”). The Dotson 
court, however, highlighted the word’s importance by using it eight times in two 
pages. See Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.   
122 Dotson, 544 U.S. at 85 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 86. 
125 Id. at 85-86. 
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Shortly after Dotson, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Osborne v. 
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District readdressed 
the issue of prisoner’s § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to 
DNA testing.126 The Osborne opinion suggested that Dotson provided 
the final word on the viability of § 1983 claims seeking post-
conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA 
testing.127 Noting how the Dotson court “emphasized that to be barred 
under Heck, a § 1983 claim must, if successful, necessarily 
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration,” the 
Osborne court reasoned that the Harvey argument that claims setting 
the stage for subsequent attack on confinement were prohibited was 
“undercut considerably.”128 
Despite Osborne’s close reading of Dotson, the language of 
Dotson does not expressly overrule the holdings of Harvey and 
Kutzner. Moreover, as noted earlier, at least one post-Dotson federal 
court has persisted in holding that prisoner’s claims for post-
conviction access to DNA testing must be confined to habeas corpus 
proceedings.129 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was forced to come to its 
own decision on the issue in the 2006 case Savory v. Lyons. 
 
III.  SAVORY V. LYONS 
 
A.  The Facts of Savory 
 
In June of 1977, Johnnie Lee Savory II was convicted for the 
murder of James Robinson and Connie Cooper, who were found dead 
                                                 
126 423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005). Dotson was filed on March 7, 2005, while 
Osborne was filed on September 8, 2005. 
127 The Osborne court wrote that “[a]ny remaining doubt as to the propriety of 
[seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing through a § 1983 claim] is removed, 
we believe, by the Court’s recent opinion in Dotson.” Id. at 1055. 
128 Id. (emphasis in original). 
129 See Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456 at 5 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 
2007), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 
2008). 
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in their Peoria, Illinois home in January of the same year.130 Although 
his first conviction was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court due to 
an involuntary confession, he “was retried and convicted” in 1981.131 
At his retrial, three of Savory’s friends stated that he had made 
incriminating statements to them.132 The state presented several pieces 
of physical evidence at the trial, including 1) strands of hair 
resembling Savory’s collected at the scene of the crime; 2) a knife 
spotted with trace amounts of blood found at Savory’s home; and 3) a 
pair of bloodstained pants Savory may have worn which matched the 
blood type of the victim.133 
Subsequent to his conviction, Savory made several attempts to 
challenge his conviction and confinement, including direct appeals,134 
habeas corpus proceedings in federal court, 135 post-conviction 
proceedings in state court,136 and a petition for a writ of mandamus.137 
In 1998, Savory filed a motion in Illinois state court138 pursuant to an 
Illinois state statute which, under certain circumstances, allows a 
defendant to conduct DNA testing on physical evidence presented at 
his trial if the method of testing was not available at the time of his 
trial.139 When Savory’s motion was denied, he appealed to the 
                                                 




134 People v. Savory, 435 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Savory, 
403 N.E.2d 118 (Ill App. Ct. 1980);. 
135 United States ex rel. Savory v. Peters, 1995 WL 9242 (N.D.Ill. January 9, 
1995); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 1985 WL 2108 (N.D.Ill. July 25, 1985), 
aff’d, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987). 
136 People v. Savory, 638 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
137 See Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006). 
138 Id. at 669. 
139 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (2008). “[T]he result of the testing [must have] the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to 
the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (2008). 
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appellate court and the Supreme Court, both of which upheld the lower 
court’s order.140 
Nearly seven years after the Illinois circuit court denied Savory’s 
motion for access to the physical evidence, Savory filed a suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of state and local officials (the 
“State”), arguing that their denial violated his constitutional rights.141 
He asked the district court to compel the State to give him access to 1) 
the bloodstained pants; 2) the hair samples; 3) the blood-spotted knife; 
and 4) DNA samples provided by Savory, his father, and others.142 The 
district court dismissed the claim on the State’s 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, finding that the two year statute of limitations had run, and 
Savory no longer had a viable claim before the court.143 Savory then 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 
 
B.  The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis 
 
Before addressing the merits of Savory’s claim, the Seventh 
Circuit first examined whether Savory could rightly bring an action to 
compel post-conviction access to physical evidence under § 1983.144 
The State argued along the lines of Harvey, asserting that Savory was 
a state prisoner attempting to challenge the “fact or duration” of his 
confinement, and his options were therefore limited to habeas 
corpus.145 Judge Kanne, who authored the opinion, noted that Supreme 
Court precedents established by Preiser and Heck prevented a claim 
                                                 
140 The Illinois Supreme Court held that because the success of the State’s case 
relied on other evidence, the bloodstained pants were not “materially relevant” to 
Savory’s innocence, and upheld the circuit court’s denial of his motion to compel 
DNA testing. People v. Savory, 756 N.E.2d 804, 811-12 (Ill. 2001). 
141 Savory, 469 F.3d at 669. The officials included the State’s Attorney of 
Peoria County, Illinois, the Clerk of the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois, the 
Chief of Police of the City of Peoria, and Peoria County, Illinois. Id. 
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from being brought under § 1983 if it “would necessarily imply the 
validity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.”146 
The court first analyzed the Supreme Court’s approaches to 
similar issues, noting that the high court’s opinion in Wilkinson v. 
Dotson had focused on Heck’s use of the use of the word 
“necessarily.”147 The court then turned its attention to how the specific 
question of post-conviction access to physical evidence had created a 
split amongst its sister circuits.148 Judge Kanne highlighted the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Bradley that not only could updated 
DNA testing further incriminate the plaintiff, but even if it did suggest 
the plaintiff’s innocence, he would need to bring an entirely separate 
action to actually challenge his confinement.149 The court also 
discussed the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning that because § 1983 would set 
up a challenge to the prisoner’s confinement, it was merely an attempt 
to circumvent the habeas corpus requirement.150 
Ultimately the court found the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in 
Bradley to be more in line with the Supreme Court’s precedents set in 
Preiser and Heck.151 Judge Kanne emphasized that the exception 
requiring the use of habeas corpus over § 1983 is narrow, and that 
courts must consider the immediate results of the success of the 
plaintiff’s motion. The court wrote: 
 
Savory will not be released from prison, nor will his 
sentence be shortened, if he successfully gains access to 
physical evidence for DNA testing. Such access would 
not imply the invalidity of his conviction. At most, he 
would have the opportunity to use the results of the 
DNA testing in a future proceeding. Thus, success in 
Savory’s action “will not demonstrate the invalidity of 
                                                 
146 Id. at 669 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). 




151 Id. at 672. 
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any outstanding criminal judgment against [him],” and 
will not unduly intrude upon the core habeas corpus 
relief.152 
 
The court therefore held that Savory had brought a cognizable claim 
under § 1983.153 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS: EVALUATION OF SAVORY IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
AND DOTSON 
 
In Savory, the Seventh Circuit was forced to choose between two 
conflicting approaches: the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit’s position 
that prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing are 
limited to habeas relief, and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s position 
that prisoners may also seek such relief through a § 1983 claim. In 
disapproving of the Harvey approach, the Seventh Circuit not only 
drew support from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s decisions on the 
matter, but also from the recent Supreme Court Wilkinson v. Dotson 
opinion. In order understand why the Seventh Circuit reached the 
proper result in Savory, it is necessary to explain a) how the Harvey 
court applied Heck; b) how Dotson’s clarification of Heck drew 
Harvey into question; and c) why the Dotson framework applied to the 
facts of Savory resolves the argument in favor of the viability of 
§ 1983 claims seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing. 
 
A.  Harvey’s “Packaging” in Applying Heck 
 
The source of the circuit split over post-conviction access to DNA 
testing lay in the Harvey court’s application of Heck and its failure to 
draw a critical distinction between two separate legal actions. The 
                                                 
152 Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)) (emphasis in 
original). 
153 Id. Despite the holding regarding the general viability of § 1983 claims 
seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing, the court ultimately affirmed the 
district court’s finding that Savory’s individual § 1983 claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations. Id. at 675. 
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Harvey court reasoned that the plaintiff’s § 1983 action could not 
proceed because it was merely a predicate to a subsequent motion 
seeking his release from prison.154 By this logic, the prisoner’s claim 
violated Heck’s mandate that prisoners seeking post-conviction relief 
be limited to habeas if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”155 
In applying Heck, the Harvey court created a single “package” out 
of two separate and distinct legal actions. The first action—which was 
the subject of the decision—was the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim seeking 
post-conviction access to DNA testing (“Action One”). The second 
action, which could only commence if the first action proved 
successful, was a motion seeking release from prison (“Action Two”).  
In order to reach its decision that Action One violated Heck, the 
Harvey court merged Action One and Action Two into one 
indistinguishable package. While Heck never suggested that this sort 
of packaging was necessary, neither was it forbidden. Thus, Harvey’s 
“packaging” approach was not drawn into serious question until 
Dotson revisited Heck. 
 
B.  How Dotson Unpackaged Harvey 
 
In Dotson, the Supreme Court examined the conflict of § 1983 
and habeas as it pertained to prisoners seeking review of parole 
procedures.156 The fundamental issue before the Dotson court was no 
different from Heck: the cognizability of a § 1983 claim for a prisoner 
seeking post-conviction relief.157 However, the factual situation 
presented in Dotson was slightly different than Heck because success 
in Dotson would not have necessarily invalidated the prisoner’s 
conviction.  Success did “not mean immediate release from 
confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it [meant] at most new 
eligibility review, which at most [would] speed consideration of a new 
                                                 
154 Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002). 
155 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 
156 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 
157 See id.; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478. 
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parole application.”158 In comparison, the Heck plaintiff could not win 
his § 1983 suit for damages without necessarily implying his 
conviction’s invalidity due to destruction of evidence and unlawful 
prosecution.159 
This distinction, highlighted by the Court’s repeated use of the 
word “necessarily,”160 was the fundamental clarification that Dotson 
provided. Dotson implicitly drew Harvey’s “packaging” approach into 
serious question by barring only those § 1983 claims which would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement. Though 
Dotson did not specifically address the viability of § 1983 claims for 
post-conviction access to DNA evidence, its relevance to the issue was 
quickly noticed by the Ninth Circuit.161 This set the stage for the 
Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the issue in Savory. 
  
C.  How Savory Got It Right by Applying Dotson 
 
When the Seventh Circuit analyzed the relevant precedent in 
Savory, it highlighted Dotson’s holding that § 1983 claims for post 
conviction relief should be barred only if they “‘necessarily’ 
implicated the fact or duration of confinement.”162 By using Dotson to 
create the judicial framework for resolving the circuit split, the Savory 
court implicitly drew the Fourth Circuit’s approach into question. 
Once the court recognized Dotson’s relevance to the issue of post-
                                                 
158 Dotson, 544 U.S. at 76. 
159 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 490. 
160 See Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81 (writing that “§ 1983 remains available for 
procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell 
immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” (emphasis in original)); see also id. 
at 81-82 (holding “that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred… if success in that 
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. 
(emphasis in original)); and id. at 82 (writing that “because neither prisoner’s claim 
would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at ’the core of habeas corpus.’ 
(quoting Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973))).  
161 Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District, 423 F.3d 
1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2005). 
162 Id. at 671. 
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conviction requests for DNA testing, a decision validating the use of 
§ 1983 claims became inevitable.  
The Savory court first noted that § 1983 claims for post-
conviction access to DNA testing may prove either exculpatory or 
inculpatory.163 If the DNA test showed that the prisoner indeed 
committed the crime, then the result of the § 1983 action would not 
have called the prisoner’s confinement into question. As such, so long 
as a chance exists that DNA testing could prove inculpatory, then a 
§ 1983 claim merely seeking access to the testing cannot necessarily 
call into question the validity of a prisoner’s confinement. 
The Seventh Circuit then incorporated the Dotson argument, 
stating that even if the DNA testing proved exculpatory, the plaintiff 
would still have to bring another legal action to pursue actual release 
from prison.164 Judge Kanne wrote that “to overturn his conviction 
[the plaintiff would have to bring] ‘an entirely separate action at some 
future date, in which he would have to argue for his release upon the 
basis of a separate constitutional violation altogether.’”165 
Procedurally, this is synonymous with the Supreme Court’s rationale 
in Dotson that the plaintiff’s success in the § 1983 action would only 
mean a new review by the prison parole board, where an entirely 
separate action—the actual review itself—would be necessary to 
secure release from prison.166 By applying Dotson in this way, Savory 
“unpackaged” Action One (the § 1983 action seeking access to DNA 
testing) from Action Two (the subsequent action seeking release from 
prison). It is this second action—in which a plaintiff would argue that 
he was being imprisoned despite the existence of exculpatory DNA 
evidence proving his innocence—that should be limited to habeas 
relief, as it is the only action which truly challenges the validity of the 
plaintiff’s confinement. As the Savory court correctly pointed out, 
                                                 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.(quoting Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., 
concurring). 
166 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). 
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access alone cannot imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s 
confinement.167 
Judge Kanne also made sure to address the comity issue that 
played a central role in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Harvey.168 
Because a plaintiff’s success “[would] not demonstrate the invalidity 
of any outstanding criminal judgment against [him],” his § 1983 claim 
would not unduly intrude upon territory traditionally reserved for 
habeas actions.169 
Finally, while not mentioned in Savory, it bears noting that Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Dotson provides further support for the 
Seventh Circuit’s result. Justice Scalia asserted that the common law 
roots of the writ of habeas corpus should act as a limit on the relief the 
writ can actually provide.170 If the sought-after relief bears no 
resemblance to actual release from prison (or at least the shortening of 
a sentence), then use of the writ would “broaden the scope of habeas 
relief beyond recognition.”171 In the case of Savory, gaining access to 
physical evidence in order to perform DNA testing would not fall 
within the limited scope of habeas relief. As such, it would be 
inappropriate for Savory to seek access to testing through a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of Dotson’s relevance provided 
the key to reaching the correct result in Savory. Dotson provided a 
method to undo the “packaging” approach created in Harvey, which 
erroneously limited prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA 
testing to habeas relief. In allowing prisoners to seek such relief 
through § 1983 claims, the Savory court reached the proper result and 




                                                 
167 Savory, 469 F.3d at 672. 
168 See Harvey, 285 F.3d at 303. 
169 Savory, 469 F.3d at 672. 
170 Dotson, 544 U.S. at 85 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
171 Id. at 85. 
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Not all courts agree with Savory’s application of Dotson to the 
issue of § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to DNA testing. In 
June 2007, over two years after Dotson and nearly one year after 
Savory, a district court in the Northern District of Texas held that a 
plaintiff seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing was limited to 
habeas relief in Gilkey v. Livingston.172 While mentioning the differing 
results reached in Osborne and Bradley, the court stated that it was 
“bound by Fifth Circuit case law.”173 Such a result is at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Dotson. By holding that § 1983 claims for 
post-conviction access to DNA testing are viable, the Savory court 
reached the proper result and ensured that future cases in the Seventh 
Circuit on the issue would be in line with Supreme Court precedent. 
By arriving at the correct result, the Savory court did more than 
simply secure another procedural route for prisoners seeking post-
conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing. 
Section 1983 claims, which proceed directly to federal court, 
circumvent the state-exhaustion requirement imposed by the federal 
habeas statute that can create significant time delays.174 Additionally, 
while prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing through 
a writ of habeas corpus may not seek monetary damages, a prisoner 
seeking the same relief through a § 1983 claim can seek monetary 
damages.175 Thus, the advantages gained by allowing prisoners to 
pursue their claims through § 1983 are not merely procedural in 
nature. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Savory therefore provides 
both timely resolution and a full range of remedies to prisoners 
                                                 
172 Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456, at *5 (N.D.Tex. June 27, 2007), 
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2008). 
173 Id. at *6 n.3. 
174 For a description of the complicated process involved in seeking habeas 
relief, see Steiker, supra n.11, at 315-16 (writing that “[f]our, five or even six federal 
and state courts might address the merits of a federal claim before the defendant’s 
legal remedies are exhausted”). 
175 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Schwartz, supra n.29, at 89. 
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attempting to address wrongs suffered at the hands of government 
actors. 
As demonstrated by the success of CSI and its imitators, the 
promise of justice provided by DNA testing has captured the public 
imagination. While the benefits of this technology are obvious, there 
should be concern when those that may possibly benefit most from its 
use—prisoners who may be exonerated by an exculpatory DNA test—
are excluded from timely access due to procedural roadblocks. The 
decision in Savory ensures that these promises of justice do not remain 
a fiction confined to a prisoner’s common room TV screen. 
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